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CocKERELL v. TrTUD INs. & TausT Co.

LL. A. No. 22764.

fn Bank.

[42 C.2d

l<'eb. 24, 1954.1

l{OWENA J:1'. COCKEitBLL et al., Appellants, v. TITLE
INSURANCE AND TRUST COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Defendants and Respondents; T. E. DENNY
et al., Cross-Complainants and Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case-Rule as
to Answer.-vVhere, notwithstanding faet that denials in an
answer are not as broad as allegations of complaint or are
otherwise insufficient to put allegations of complaint in issue,
answer is treated as putting material facts in issue, plaintiff
cannot for first time on appeal object that such denials are
insufficient for any purpose.
[2] !d.-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-A party cannot permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded.
[3] Pleading- Judgment on Pleadings- Motion by Plaintiff.Plaintiffs cannot on appeal predicate error on ruling of trial
court in denying their motion for judgment on pleadings on
ground that defendants admitted all allegations of complaint
except that for lack of information or belief they denied
alleged assignment of third trust deed to plaintiffs and balance
which defendants assumed when they purchased property
from record owners, where there is no allegation in complaint
that defendants had knowledge as to how plaintiffs' alleged
assignor derived title nor that they knew how plaintiffs themselves derived title.
[4] Trust Deeds-Assignment of Debt.-If assignment of note
secured by trust deed is valid, no further assignment of trust
deed is necessary since assignment of note carries with it the
security as an incident of debt. (See Civ. Code, § 1084.)
[5] Assignments-Form and Requisites.-While no particular form
of assignment is necessary, the assignment of a right, to be
effectual, must be a manifestation to another person by the
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 149; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 316 et seq.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, § 34; Am.Jur., Mortgages, § 977
et seq.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 34; Am.Jur., Assignments,
§ 75 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error,§ 131; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 125; [3] Pleadings, § 241(7); [ 4, 6, 9] Trust Deeds,
§ 29; [ 5] Assignments, § 28; [7] Assignments, § 91; [8] Assignments, § 94; [10] Assignments, § 91; [11] Trust Deeds, § 100.
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owner indicating his intention to transfer, without further
action or manifestation of intention, the right to such other
person or to a third person.
[6a-6c] Trust Deeds-Assignment of Debt.-Plaintiffs failed to
prove assignment to them of note secured by third trust deed
where note was made payable to a limited partnership but no
connection was shown between partnership and individual who
purported to assign it on behalf of firm, where only evidence
linking the two was one plaintiff's testimony that she knew
a certain individual who was member of firm and that it was
his signature, and where she had been told by a "party" that
it was a "limited company," such evidence being insufficient
to show that partnership had complied with statutory provisions relating to use of a fictitious name ( Civ. Code, § 2468),
or that individual who signed note was member of partnership
or had authority to bind it.
[7] Assignments-Burden of Proof.-Burden of proving an assignment falls on the party asserting rights thereunder.
[8] Id.-Evidence.-In action by assignee to enforce assigned
right, evidence must not only be sufficient to establish fact of
assignment when that fact is in issue, but measure of sufficiency requires that evidence of assignment be clear and positive to protect an obligor from any further claim by primary
obligee.
[9] Trust Deeds-Assignment of Debt.-Plaintiffs, claiming as
assignees of a partnership, have burden of proving existence
and membership of firm to support their claim of ownership of
note and trust deed by virtue of assignment of note signed
by an individual on behalf of partnership.

[10] Assignments- Presumption.-Court will not presume that
person whose name is subscribed to an assignment on behalf
of a partnership actually executed assignment or had authority to execute it.

[11] Trust Deeds-Sale Under Power-Application of ProceedsSurplus.-Plaintiffs, having failed to prove valid assignment
to them of note secured by third trust deed, have no standing
to complain of judgment awarding surplus yield resulting
from trustee's sale of property under second trust deed to defendants who are only other claimants of such surplus.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief.
affirmed.

Judgment against plaintiffs
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N. S. Crowley for Appellants.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
Morris Lavine for Cross-Complainants and Respondents.
CAR'l'ER, J.-Plaintiffs and cross-defendants, Rowena F.
Cockerell and Jeannie A. Hinds, appeal from a judgment
entered against them in an action for declaratory relief.
On August
1951, Ernest A. Coe and Helen Jean Coe,
husband and wife, were the record owners of the real property here involved. This property was subject to a first deed
of trust dated May 5, 1947, executed by Metropole Holding
Company, Inc., a corporation, to Lawyers Title Company,
trustee, to secure an indebtedness of $63,000. It was also
subject to a second trust deed dated October 16, 1947, executed by Omart Investment Company, Ltd., to Title Insurance and Trust Company, trustee, to secure an indebtedness
of $27,500. It was subject to a third trust deed, dated September 23, 1948, executed by Russ Green and Ethyl Green
to Security First National Bank of Los Angeles, trustee,
to secure an indebtedness of $10,983.80 in favor of Crestmore
Company. Plaintiffs' claim is by virtue of an alleged assignment from the Crestmore Company.
Defendants and cross-complainants, T. E. Denny and Edna
Denny, on August 28, 1951, held an unrecorded deed to the
property which they had received from Ernest A. Coe and
Helen Jean Coe.
On April 26, 1951, foreclosure proceedings in accordance
with the provisions of section 2924 of the Civil Code were
instituted by the Title Insurance and Trust Company, as
trustee, under the second deed of trust. These proceedings
culminated in a sale which was held on August 28, 1951.
At this sale, the trustee 'l'itle Insurance and Trust Company
received the sum of $25,950. 'fhe balance due, under the deed
of trust so foreclosed, including the expenses of sale, amounted
to $19,023.98 leaving a surplus yield of $6,926.02. This
surplus yield is the subject matter of the controversy between plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs claim as the owners
of the third trust deed by virtue of assignment from the beneficiary, Crestmore Company; defendants claim as the owners
of the unrecorded deed to the property. Both parties made
demands for the surplus yield upon defendant trustee, Title
Insurance Company. Defendant trustee answered and crosscomplained, and was permitted to deposit with the clerk of
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the court the :mrplm; funds
to the sum of
and the action was ordered dismissed as to it.
The trial court found that
T. E. and Edna
Denny, were the owners of the
involved; that there
was a surplus yield of $6,926.02 after the foreclosure sale
under the second deed of trust; that at the time of the trustee's
sale, there was on record a
third trust deed, executed by Russ Green and Ethyl Green, to Security-:B~irst
National Bank of Los Angeles,
in favor of Crestmore Company, as well as a purported fourth trust deed
executed by 'l'. I-i1. and Edna ,Denny to J_~iberty Escrow
Company, trustee, in favor of Ernest A. and Helen .Tean
Coe. It was found that the liens, if any, of the third and
fourth trust deeds, were extinguished by the foreclosure of
the second deed of trust; that it was not true that plaintiffs
were the owners of the note and third deed of trust by means
of assignment by the Crestmore Company; that it was not
true that there was an unpaid balance due plaintiffs on their
alleged third deed of trust and note in the sum of $7,049.35.
It was also found that Emest A. and Helen Jean Coe had
no right, title, or interest in or to the real property involved,
or to the surplus yield; that plaintiffs had no right, title or
interest in the surplus yield or the real property; that T. E.
and Edna Denny, as joint tenants, were entitled to a judgment for the surplus yield.
Plaintiffs' first contention is that the court erred in denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings. It was
argued that the only issues raised in the pleadings were issues
of law. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged their ownership
of the note secured by the third deed of trust by virtue of an
assignment from the Crestmore Company. 'l'his was denied,
upon lack of information by the defendants. Plaintiffs contend that a judgment may be rendered on the pleadings if
the answer consists of denials on information and belief or
for want of information or belief of matters which the defendant is pres1rmerl to know (21 Cal..Jur. 237; Wickersham
v. Comerford, 104 Cal. 494 [38 P. 101] and Overton v. White,
]8 Cal.App.2d 567 [64 P.2d 758, 65 P.2d 99]). No contention
is made that tbe denial contained in defendants' answer
'' . . . these defendants do not have sufficient information
as to the allegation contained therein [as to the fact of assignment] and basing their denial upon that ground, generally and specifically deny the same" is insufficient to raise
an issue as to the fact o£ assignment because it does not follow
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the wording of the statute (Code Civ. Pro c., § 437, which
provides fol' a denial upon lack of 'infor-rnat'ion or- bel!ief).
'fhis type of denial has been held insufficient to raise an issue
of ownership (May v. Boar-d of Dir-ector-s of El Camino Trr-.
Dist., 34 Cal.2d 125 l208 P.2d 661] ). However, at the trial
plaintiffs treated the question of assignment as an issue, and
at the commencement of the trial, introduced in evidence the
note bearing on its back the assignment thereof to them. The
only evidence as to the assignment was introduced by plaintiff Hinds as will hereafter appear. [1] It is a general
rule that where, notwithstanding the fact that the denials in an
answer are not as broad as the allegations of the complaint
or are otherwise insufficient to put the allegations of the complaint in issue, but the answer is treated as putting the material facts in issue, the plaintiff cannot for the first time
on appeal object that such denials were insufficient for any
purpose (3 Cal.Jur.2d, § 149; Adarns v. Bell, 5 Cal.2d 697
[56 P.2d 208]; Hernandez v. Her-nandez, 109 Cal.App.2d
903 [242 P.2d 59]). In A1·onson &; Co. v. Pear-son, 199 Cal.
295, 298-299 [249 P. 191], it was said: "Such a denial will
not be held fatally defective upon appeal if it was treated
by the parties at the trial as creating an issue, but, since in
this case neither party offered any evidence bearing upon the
question, there is no ground for holding that it was so
treated.'' Any objection to the sufficiency of the denial in
defendants' answer could have been obviated had proper objection thereto been made in the court below. To hold now
that the defective answer raised no issue of fact when it was
so treated by all the parties and the court upon the trial
below would be "clearly unjust."
The situation here is somewhat similar to those cases where
issues not raised by the pleadings are litigated at the trial
without objection. [2] As stated by Mr. Justice Schauer
in Va~tghn v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586, at page 605 [191 P.2d
432] : "The evidence hereinabove reviewed is consistent with
the view that the case was tried on the theory that malice was
at issue and that punitive damages were claimed. A party cannot permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape the
consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded.
(Slaughter v. Goldber-g, Bowen &; Co. (1915), 26 Cal.App.
318, 325 [147 P. 90]; Boyle v. Coast Improvement Co. (1915),
27 Cal.App. 714, 720-721 [151 P. 25]; Hir-sch v. Jarnes S.
Remick Co. (1918), 38 Cal.App. 764, 767 [177 P. 876];
Pioneer Truck Co. v. Hawley (1920), 47 Cal.App. 594, 595
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[190 P. 1037 J ; McCord v. Martin (1920), 47 Cal.App. 717,
723 [191 P. 89 J ; Avakian v. Noble (1898), 121 Cal. 216, 219
[53 P. 559]; 8 Cal.Jur. 893.)"
[3] Moreover it is apparent from the phraseology used
in plaintiffs' brief on appeal that they considered the denial
technically sufficient. Plaintiffs argue (p. 10) "Defendants
Denny admitted all the facts alleged, except that they denied
for lack of information or belief the alleged assignment of the
third trust deed to plaintiffs and the balance which said
defendants assumed when they purchased the property from
defendants Coe.
"Plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings on the
rule that denials on information and belief of facts presumptively within the knowledge of the defendants raised no issue.
. . . " It was also stated that "The defendants, T. E. Denny
and Edna Denny admitted all the allegations of the complaint
e.xcept that for lack of information or belief they denied the
allegations of ownership of the third trust deed in the plaintiffs and for the same reason denied the alleged balance due
thereunder.'' (Emphasis added.)
It appears here that defendants did not, presumably, have
knowledge as to how plaintiffs' alleged assignor derived title
since there is no allegation to that effect in the complaint,
nor did they know how plaintiffs themselves derived title
since the only allegations concerning it is the statement that
they claim by virtue of an assignment from the Crestmore
Company which, in turn, claimed under a trust deed executed
by Russ and Ethyl Green who were, apparently, strangers to
the title. It follows that under the circumstances here prevailing plaintiffs cannot now predicate error on the ruling of
the trial court in denying their motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
It is next contended that the court erred in finding that
plaintiffs were not the owners of the third trust deed and
note by virtue of assignment. This is, essentially, a contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the iindings
of the court in this respect. Mrs. ,Teannie A. Hinds, the only
one of the two plaintiffs to testify, said that she received the
note late in the evening on the day before the foreclosure
sale. The note was received in evidence. The note, for
$10,983.80, secured by a deed of trust, was made payable to
"Crestmore Co., a Limited partnership. P. 0. Box 365, Fontana'' and was signed by Russ Green and Ethyl Green. On
42 C.2d-10
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the reverse side was endorsed ''The undersigned does hereby
assign this note to the account of Rowena F. Cockerell and
Jeannie i'i. Hinds, as of the 27th day of August, 1951.
[Signed] The Crestmore Co. P. H. Wierman." Plaintiff
Hinds testified that ''a party'' had told her about the Crestmore Company and that she knew there were three members :
''Paul and Bob Wierman, brothers, and one other woman.
I don't know her name just at this minute, but they were
checked on as to the company and being in their name.''
Plaintiffs were unable to produce the articles of partnership.
There was no other evidence as to either the Crestmore Company or the P. H. Wierman who purportedly signed the endorsement other than plaintiff Hinds' testimony that she knew
it was his signature. On August 27, 1951, on a plain sheet
of paper entitled ''To whom it may concern'' there was a
statement signed by "P. H. Wierman, Crestmore Company"·
that ''Rowena F. Cockerell and Jeannie A. Hinds are the
beneficiaries of an escrow in which the assignment of a third
trust deed, document No. 1205 recorded at request of Title
Insurance & Trust Co., Oct. 1, 1949, at 8 a. m., Book 28401,
Page 55, in the Official Records, County of Los Angeles, California, to their account in progress and they have full right
and title to said third trust deed and all benefits from such
from this day on." It was admitted by plaintiffs that this
paper was the only assignment which they had relating to the
trust deed. Plaintiff Hinds testified that an escrow was
opened on August 29, 1951, for the sale of the note to plaintiffs; that she gave her note for $6300 which was to be returned
to her in the event that certain other documents and notes
were turned over to the escrow holder in completion of the
escrow. The escrow instructions, dated August 28, 1951,
read, in part, that "Receipt is hereby acknowledged by
Rowena F. Cockerell and Jeannie A. Hinds for trust deed
in the amount of ten thousand nine hundred eighty three
dollars and eighty cents ($10,983.80) balance due approximately sixty eight hundred dollars ($6,800.00), delivered outside of escrow and not the concern of this escrow . . . . " (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff Hinds' testimony with respect to the Crestmore
Company and P. H. 'Wierman was received over objection
that no foundation had been laid, that the answer called for a
conclusion of the witness, and that her answers were hearsay.
She testified that the signature on the reverse side of the note
was that of a Mr. Paul Wierman who was a member of the
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Crestmore Company; that the Crestmore Company was a
"limited company"; that "a party in San Bernardino" had
told her. Defendants objected and moved to strike her testimony on the ground that it was not the best evidence of
the partnership and that her answers were ''conclusions.''
The third trust deed was admitted in evidence over the objection that there had been no showing that it had been assigned, or any record of its assignment to the plaintiffs.
[4] Assuming for the moment that the assignment of
the note, secured by the third trust deed, was a valid
assignment, no further assignment of the deed of trust was
necessary. Section 1084 of the Civil Code provides that "The
transfer of a thing transfers also all its incidents, unless
expressly excepted; but the transfer of an incident to a thing
does not transfer the thing itself." (See, also, Hurt v. Wilson,
38 Cal. 263; Lewis v. Booth, 3 Cal.2d 345 [44 P.2d 560];
1J1arx v. McKinney, 23 Cal.2d 439, 443 [144 P.2d 353]; Union
Supply Co. v. Jlforris, 220 Cal. 331 [30 P.2d 394] .) In Lewis
v. Booth, supm, 3 Cal.2d 345, it was held that an acknowledgment was not necessary to effect an assignment of the trust
deed and that the endorsement of the note by the payee
was sufficient to transfer the deed of trust without other
assignment. In Santens v. Los Angeles Finance Co., 91 Cal.
App.2d 197 [204 P.2d 619], it was held that the note carries
with it the security and the trust deed was merely an
incident of the debt and could only be foreclosed by the
owner of the note.
Plaintiff Hinds' testimony and the endorsement on the
note secured by the third deed of trust showed that it was
given on August 27th, 1951, the night before the foreclosure
sale under the second deed of trust. If the assignment were
otherwise sufficient, it would have been given prior to the
foreclosure sale because the time of transfer of the deed
of trust is immaterial under the authorities above cited.
[5] ·while no particular form of assignment is necessary,
the assignment, to be effectual, must be a manifestation to
another person by the owner of the right indicating his
intention to transfer, without further action or manifestation
of intention, the right to such other person, or to a third person
(Rest. Contracts, § 149(1); Anglo California Nat. Bank v.
Kidd, 58 Cal.App.2d 651 [137 P.2d 460]). [6a] The note here
was made payable to '' Crestmore Co., a Limited Partnership
P. 0. Box 365, Fontana." The note shows no connection
between the Crestmore Company and the P. H. Wierman who
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purported to assign it on behalf of that company. The only
evidence in the record linking the two is that of plaintiff
Hinds who testified she knew a Mr. Paul \Vierman who was
a member of the firm and that it was his signature. She had
been told by a "party" that it was a "limited company."
'fhe record is devoid of any evidence showing a compliance
with section 2468 of the Civil Code which provides, in part,
that "No person doing business under a fictitious name, or
his assignee or assignees, nor any persons doing business as
partners contrary to the provisions of this article or their
assignee or assignees shall maintain any action upon or on
account of any contract or contracts made, or transactions
had under such fictitious name, or their partnership name,
in any court of this state until the certificate has been filed
and publication made as herein required.'' (Emphasis added.)
[7] The burden of proving an assignment falls upon the
party asserting rights thereunder (Read v. Buffnm, sttpra,
79 Cal. 77 [21 P. 555, 12 Am.St.Rep. 131] ; Ford v. Bttshard,
116 Cal. 273 [ 48 P. 119] ; Bovard v. Dickenson, 131 Cal. 162
[ 63 P. 162] ; Nakagawa v. Okanwto, 164 Cal. 718 [130 P. 707]).
[8] In an action by an assignee to enforce an assigned right,
the evidence must not only be sufficient to establish the fact of
assignment when that fact is in issue ( Qttan Wye v. Chin Lin
Hee, 123 Cal. 185 [55 P. 783]) but the measure of sufficiency
requires that the evidence of assignment be clear and positive
to protect an obligor from any further claim by the primary
oblig·ee ( Gnstafson v. Stockton etc. R. R. Co., 132 Cal. 619
[64 P. 995] ). [6b] Here there was an assignment on the back
of the note secured by the third trust deed which was purportedly signed by P. H. Wierman for the Crestmore Company; there was no competent evidence with respect to the
Crestmore Company, its membership, or P. H. Wierman's
authority to bind that company. [9] Plaintiffs, claiming
as assignees of that company, had the burden of proving the
existenee and membership of the firm in order to support
their claim of ownership of the note and third trust deed
(Welch v. Alcott, 185 Cal. 731 [198 P. 626]). In Bengel v.
Kenney, 126 Cal.App. 735 [14 P.2d1031], where the plaintiff
elaimed title under an assignment of a purported assignee of
a corporation but the evidence failed to show that the assignment by the corporation was executed by a person having
authority to do so, it was held that the evidence failed to show
title in the plaintiff by reason of such an assignment. In
Brown v. Ball, 123 Cal.App. 758 [12 P.2d 28], it was held
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tlial tbe evidence

insuftieient to establish the execntion
wlH·.re then~ wm; uo evidence to show that
tlw person 1rlwse name
be
thereto or that the
had
to
('X('CII te the instrument.
For the above' reasons it
failed
to prove a valid assigDmrnt of the note and thh·d trust deed
stand in the same position as
to them. As
their
. the Crestmorc
and mnst prove their
elwin of title to the note in
As was said in
Braum v.
supra, 123
'' ... we think that
it wonld be a dangerous innovation to hold that on such proof,
without more, an assignment purporting to be executed by
an agrnt, as each of these were, con1d be introduced into
eyidence. l-Ye are asked to presume not only that the persons
whose names are subscriberl
executed the assignments,
but also that they had
to do so merely bcccanse they
were receiyed
the mail m their
form after
having bern mailed to th<e
assignors with a request
1hat they bP executed." In
case, we would have
to assnme the pm1ition of lluss and Ethyl Green in the chain
of title, that the Crestmore Company had complied with the
statutory provisiom relating to the use oi a fictitious name,
;wd that P. II. \Vierman was a melllber of the firm with
the authority to exeente an assignment of the note made
payable to tbat firm. Snell assumptions, would indeed, constitute a "dangerous innovation."
Plaintiifs colltend that the trial court erred in finding that
the balance alleg·cdly (lue them under the third trust deed
was not as alleged; that the liens of the third and fourth trust
deeds werr extinguished by the foreclosure of the second trust
deed; and that the defendants were entitled to the surplus
funds as ownrrs of an unrecorded deed to the property. Error
is also claimed in the admission of testimony, over objection,
of tlw consideration paid by plaintiff to the Crestmore Company. [11] In view of our eonclusion that plaintiffs failed
io prove a valid assignment to them of the note secured by
the thin1 deed of trust, they have no standing' to complain
of the jndgmcnt Rwarding the surplus
to the defendants
wl!o were the only other claimants therefor. 'l'he other errors
complained of do not require discussion.
'rhe findings o£ the trial court are amply sustained by
the_ record, and the :findings support the judgment.
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'l'he judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
Uibson, C. ,] ., Shenk, J ., 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment solely upon the
ground that the record does not show, as a matter of law,
that the trust deed under which the appellants claim was executed by one who at that time was the owner of the property.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent.
Justice Carter's opinion holds that an issue as to the fact of
assignment must be presumed to have been raised and that the
evidence fails to prove an assignment of the note to the plaintiffs. Neither the record nor the law supports this holding.
The clerk's transcript shows that the answer of the defendants T. E. Denny and Edna Denny does not contain any
denial sufficient to raise an issue as to the fact of assignment.
The language of the answer is as follows : ''Answering Paragraph IV of said complaint, these defendants do not have
sufficient information as to the allegation contained therein,
and basing their denial upon that ground, generally and
specifically deny the same.''
It has been the law of this state for the past 95 years that
an attempted denial in the form and substance of the language
above quoted raises no issue. (Aronson & Co. V. Pearson
(1926), 199 Cal. 295, 297-298 [249 P. 191]; May v. Board of
Directors of El CaminQ Irr. Dist. (1949), 34 Cal.2d 125, 127
[208 P.2d 661]; North v. Evans (1931), 117 Cal.App. 317, 320
l3 P .2d 609].) As repeatedly pointed out in the cases section
437 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant
if he "has no information or belief upon the subject sufficient
to enable him to answer an allegation of the complaint . . .
may so state in his answer, and place his denial on that
ground,'' but it is wholly insufficient to merely aver lack of
information or knowledge as a basis for denial, and, as held
in the May case, supra, ''A denial in that form is insufficient
to present an issue on the subject of ownership.''
However, even if we assume that the fact of plaintiffs'
title to the note (and accompanying security) was placed in
issue the ultimate result must be the same. The evidence
as to plaintiffs' ownership is uncontradicted. The opinion
seeks to avoid its effect on two theories: 1. That the evidence
of ownership is not competent or sufficient; 2. That ·the
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plaintiffs' title must fail because they did not prove that
the payee of the note, the '' Crestmore Co., a Limited Partnership,'' had complied with section 2468 of the Civil Code.
As to the first contention, the evidence shows without
dispute that plaintiffs had possession of the note, that they
produced it, and that on the reverse side it was endorsed
''The undersigned does hereby assign this note to the account
of [plaintiffs] . . . , as of the 27th day of August, 1951.
[Signed] The Crestmore Co. P. H. Wierman." The note was
purchased through an escrow for a consideration purporting
to amount to a value of at least $6,300. The production of
the note, without more, was sufficient evidence of ownership.
It is presumed that "things which a person possesses are owned
by him" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 11) and when a
note purporting to bear the endorsement of the payee is
produced by the transferee it is presumed that the transferee
has acquired it for value and is the owner thereof (Waldrip
v. Black (1887), 74 Cal. 409, 411-412 [16 P. 226]; Ramboz
v. Stansbury (1910), 13 Cal.App. 649, 652 [110 P. 472];
Carver v. San Joaquin Cigm· Co. (1911), 16 Cal.App. 761,
769 [118 P. 92]). Under the circumstances shown the evidence does not support a finding that plaintiffs do not have
title. (Reinert v. Proud (1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 169, 171 [47
P.2d 491]; see also Sipe v. W. I. Hollingsworth & Co. (1950),
99 Cal.App.2d 391, 392 [221 P.2d 991) .)
The second contention in the majority opinion-that plaintiffs must fail because they did not prove that their predecessor in interest, the Crestmore Company, had complied
with section 2468 of the Civil Code-is wholly devoid of
merit. This is not an action to recover on the note; it is
a proceeding for declaratory relief. If the plaintiffs are the
owners of the note but cannot maintain an action on it until
their predecessors have complied with section 2468 the court
should so declare. Section 2468 cannot work a forfeiture of
the plaintiffs' title to the note or to the funds here involved;
it could, at most, be availed of as a plea in abatement in an
action on the note. (Kadota Fig Assn. v. Case-Swayne Co.
(1946), 73 Cal.App.2d 796,802 [167 P.2d 518].) Furthermore, the pleadings in this case are completely silent on this
issue; there is no plea in abatement. A plaintiff is not required to allege or prove compliance with this section, since
noncompliance is a matter of defense, and the issue cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal. (Phillips v. Goldtree
(1887), 74 Cal. 151, 154-155 [13 P. 313, 15 P. 451]; see, also,
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"Vance v. Gilbert (1918), 178 Cal. 574,578 [174 P. 42].) "The

rule is also settled that it is not necessary that the plaintiffs
have complied with the statute at the time of the commencement of the action; that it is sufficient if they have done so
at the time at least when issue as to the matter of abatement
is made." (Rtcdneck v. So1tthern California M. & R. Co.
(1920), 184 Cal. 274, 282 [193 P. 775].) Here, that issue
has never been made.
It follows that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 25,
1954. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[S. F. Nos. 18593, 18640.
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THOMAS W. GOW ANLOCK et al., Respondents, v. JAMES
TURNER, as Manager of Utilities, etc., et al., Appellants; JOSEPH ROBINSON, Intervener and Appellant.
[1] Statutes-Mandatory and Directory Acts.-Requirements of a
statute are directory, not mandatory, unless means be provided for its enforcement.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Employees- Compensation- Hours
of Service and Overtime.-San Francisco Charter, § 125, defining basic work day for platform men or bus operators in
municipal railway system as eight hours, to be completed within ten consecutive hours, and providing overtime pay for all
labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one day,
does not require city to pay for eight hours of work on a
given day or 48 hours per week regardless of duties performed,
but merely specifies basis of compensation for employees.
[3] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Hours of Service and Overtime.-Failure of former San Francisco Charter, § 33 (carried
into § 150 of new charter in 1932) to change basic provision
that "No . . . employee of the City and County shall be paid
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service," at
time § 125 of charter, relating to basic work day for platform
men or bus operators in municipal railway system, was
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 247 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Municipal Corporations, § 25fi et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Statutes, § 11; [2-5] Municipal Corporations, § 301; [6-11] Municipal Corporations, § 302.

